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CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et. al..
Petitioners,
V.
JOHN DOE, et. al.,
Respondents.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITES STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, Ronald O. Otte, and Bruce M. Botelho, respectfully submit this brief and 
request that this court REVERSE the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit on Respondents’ ex post facto claim. Petitioner, the Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety, respectfully requests that this court REVERSE the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Respondents’ due process claim.
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United Stales Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at Doe 
1 \ . Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001). The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit is reported at Doe v. Conn. Dent, of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Cases in the Courts of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after 
rendition of judgment or decree. 28 U.S.C. 1254 (West 1993). Final judgment in Doe 1 v. Pile 
was entered on April 9, 2001. (J.A. 227.) This Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2002. 
(J..A. 229.) Final judgment in Doe v. Conn. Dent. ol Public Safety was entered on May 18, 2001. 
(J.A. 72.) This Court granted certiorari on May 20, 2002. (J.A. 108.)
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Tlic Constitutional Pro\ isions relevant to the disposition of this case are U.S. Const, art.
1. 10, and U.S. Const, amend. XIV. The statutory provisions relevant to the disposition of this
case are 42 U.S.C. i; 1983, 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41, Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010 (Lexis L.
Pubig. 2001), and Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-261 (2001), amended by 2001 Conn. Legis. Serv. 
01-84 (West).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pft-liminar\' Statement
1. Alaska Sex Offender Reiiistration Act: Ex Post Facto Claim 
On May 13, 1994, John Doe I. Jane Doe, and John Doe II (hereinafter “Respondents") 
nied a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska. (J.A. 110.) Respondents brought their action against the state commissioner for public 
safety and the state attorney general to enjoin enforcement of the Alaska Se.\ Otlcnder 
Registration Act (hereinafter “Alaska Statute"), Alaska Stat. 12.63.010. (J.A. 110.)
Respondents alleged that enforcement of the registration and notilication provisions ot the 
Alaska Statute N'iolatcd the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. (J.A. 112-13, 119.) 
Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the Alaska Statute requirements. (J.A.
no.)
The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring public disclosure of the 
Respondents' registration information, but denied their motion to proceed under pseudonyms. 
(J.A. 213.) In the original complaint. John Doe I was known as "James Rowe." (J.A. 213.)
When the Alaska Respondents refused to amend their complaint to include their real names, the 
district conn dismissed the action. (J.A. 213.) On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals lor 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
use pseudonyms. (J.A. 213.)
Following remand to the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. (J.A. 202-03.) The district court determined that there had been no violation of 
Respondents’ rights and granted the state’s motion. (J.A. 204.) On August 13, 1999, the district 
court entered judgment against Respondents and dismissed their complaint. (J.A. 204.)
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However, the district court reinstated its preliminary injunction after Respondents filed a notice 
of appeal with the Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 194.)
On August 18. 1999. Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 204.) On review, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. (J.A. 222.) The court held that the Alaska Statute’s registration and 
notillcation provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United Slates Constitution 
because their effects were punitive to such an extent that they overcame the Alaska Statute's 
slated. non-punili\e intent and presumption of constitutionality. (J.A. 215, 222.) This Court 
granted ceiliorari on February 19,2002. Ottc v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1126(2002).
2. Connectieut Sex Offender Registration Act: Respondents’ Due Process Claim 
On February 22. 1999, John Doe, representing a class of similarly situated sex offender 
registrants (hereinafter “Connecticut Respondents"), filed an action with the United States 
District Couil for the District of Connecticut, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (J.A. 3.) Connecticut 
Respondents alleged that the provisions of the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act 
(“Connecticut Act”), Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-250-261, violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. (J.A. 4- 
5.) Connecticut Respondents sought both declarative and injunctive relief from state 
enforcement of the Connecticut Act's provisions. (J.A. 20-21.)
The parlies filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (J.A. 65, 67.) On March 31, 
2000, the district court denied in part and granted in part the motions for summary judgment.
(J.A. 69.) Specifically, the court held that the Connecticut Act violated the Due Process Clause 
on the grounds that its public notification provisions falsely stigmatized registrants, and its 
registration requirement altered their legal status, thereby satisfying the “stigma plus" test for due
4
process violation. (J.A. 51.) However, the court held that it did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. (J.A. 52.) The court then granted the Connecticut Respondents* motion for a permanent 
injunction. (J.A. 71.)
In May 2001, the parties filed cross-appeals to the United Stales Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. (J.A. 73-75.) On review, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
injunction on due process grounds. (J.A. 81.) The court reasoned that the legislature's public 
safety intent behind the law in conjunction with public notification, created a false stigma of 
dangerousness. (J.A. 87.) The court further determined that the Connecticut Act’s registration 
requirements satisfied the “plus” factor because they alter registrants’ legal status and are 
governmental in nature. (J.A. 93.) The Court of Appeals elected not to decide the ex post facto 
issue. (J.A. 96.) This Court granted ccniorari on May 20, 2002. Conn, Dept, of Public Safety \ . 
Doe. 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002).
Statement of Facts
In 1994, seven-year old Megan Kanka was the victim of a brutal sexual assault and 
murder in New Jersey. E.B. v. Vcmiero. 119F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997). The perpetrator 
lived across the street from Megan’s home, and had twice been convicted of sex offenses 
iin olving young girls, jd. The alanning circumstances of Megan Kanka’s death prompted the 
New Jersey legislature to enact a registration and notification law for convicted sex offenders.
Id. Though not the first American jurisdiction to register sex offenders, New Jersey’s 
registration and notification law served as a catalyst for numerous other states to enact what have 
come to be known as “Megan’s Laws.” Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive 
State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws. 89 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 1167, 1172 (1999).
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Slionly iherearter, ihc United Stales Congress followed suit and passed the Jacob 
Weiteiiing Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program. 42
l.'.S.C. vj 14701 (West 1996). The legislation conditioned the states' receipt of certain federal 
funds on local law cnforcemeni implementation of a program to disseminate relevant information 
regarding convicted sex offenders released back into the community. Id Now, all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia have some form of sex offender registration requirements in force. 
Logan. 89 j. Crim. L. cV Criminology at 1175. Nineteen slates, including Alaska and 
Connecticut. eniplo> a “compulsory approach." whereby offenders satisfying specific statutory. 
olTense-related criteria are subject to the registration and notification prox isions. Id.
1. Alaska Statute: Doe I et. al. v. Otle. Ex Post Facto Claim.
On May 12. 1994, ihc Alaska Legislature enacted the Alaska Sex Offender Registration 
.Act (hereinafter “Alaska Statute"). (J.A. 213.) This legislative decision came on the heels of a 
“crisis" situation regarding Alaska's high rate of sexual offense. (J.A. 213.) The legislature 
heard testimony that Alaska had the highest rate of child sexual abuse in the nation, and had the 
second highest rale of sexual assault. (J.A. 139.) Testimony presented to legislators further 
cs idenced an extremely high rale of recidivism for sex offenders. (J.A. 140.) Moreover, in 
1993. one hundred convicted sex oflendcrs were scheduled to be released from prison; twice as 
many as usual. (J.A. 140.)
Under the Alaska Statute, any person convicted of a sex offense, in any jurisdiction, is 
subject to the registration and notification requirements. (J.A. 140-41.) The Alaska statute 
requires registrants to submit to photographing and fingerprinting, and to provide certain 
personal information. (J.A. 213.) Failure to comply results in criminal penalties. (J.A. 213.)
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John Doe I and John Doe II are con\'icted se.\ offenders subject to the registration and 
notification requirements of the Alaska Statute. (J.A. 214.) In 1985, John Doe I had entered a 
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor following a court determination 
that he had sexually abused his daughter for a period of two years. (J.A. 212.) He was 
incarcerated for eight years and released in 1990. (J.A. 212.) In 1984, John Doc II had entered a 
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexually abusing a fourteen-year-old child. (J.A. 213.) He 
was sentenced to eight years in prison, and was also released in 1990. (J.A. 213.)
2. Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act: Doe v. Conn. Dept, of Pub. Safety.
Due Process Claim.
Under Connecticut’s version of “Megan’s Law,’’ persons convicted of certain enumerated 
sex offenses are required to register with the Commissioner of Public Safety upon their release 
into the community. Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-250-261 (2001). All registrants must provide 
certain information, including: name, address, place of employment, criminal convictions, and a 
photograph. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251-254 (2001). Registrants are required to notify the 
Commissioner upon change of address, and submit to being photographed at least every live 
years. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251-254. Failure to comply constitutes a felony offense. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-254 (2001). The gathered information is then made public via a central 
registry', which is required to be accessible over the Internet. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)(l) 
(2001).
The registration requirements vary depending on the type of sex offense committed.
(J.A. 27.) Also, certain classes of offenders may be completely exempted from registration 
obligations if a court finds that registration is not necessary for public safety. Conn. Gen Stat.
The information collected under the registration requirement is made publicly available through
the Department of Public Safety’s central registry website. (J.A. 214.)
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54-25 l{b)-(c) (2001). A court may enter an order restricting the dissemination of registry 
information if it finds that public safety does not require disclosure. Conn. Gen Stat. § 54- 
251 (b)-(c). Depending on the underlying offense, certain registrants may petition for such an 
order. Conn. Gen. Stat § 54-255(c) (2001). Further, the Connecticut Department of Public 
Safely has a procedure in place to respond to challenges regarding the authenticity of registr\' 
data. (J.A. 30.) An individualized assessment of se.\ otlenders' public safety threat is not made 
in determining whether registration is required. (J.A. 30.) Rather, the sentencing court 
determines whether the felony committed was for a sexual purpose, and thus, whether sex 
offender registration is necessar)'. (J.A. 82.) The website includes a disclaimer notifying 
\ icwers that no indi\'idualizcd assessment of a particular registrant s dangerousness has been 
made, and that it is a crime to use the regisir>’ information for purposes of harassment. (J.A. 31.)
John Doe is a eom icted sex offender subject to the registration and notification 
requirements of the Connecticut Act. (J.A. 3.) He represents a class of plaintifts who allege the 
Act creates a constitutional deprivation of due process rights. (J.A. 4-5.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hoth the Alaska and Connecticut statutes are constitutional. They do not violate 
Respondents' rights and should be upheld by this Court.
The Alaska Statute is constitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Alaska 
Le^dslature enacted the Alaska Statute with the sole and express intent of protecting its citizens. 
The registration and notification requirements are not so onerous or punitive that they rise to the 
level of “clearest proof’ required to negate the legislature’s intent. The Ninth Circuit correctly 
concluded that three of the seven factors it considered in analyzing the effects of the Alaska 
Statute did not point to any punitive effect. The Ninth Circuit wrongly decided that any of the
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remaining four factors were sufficient to overcome the combined weight of the first three factors 
and the presumption of constitutionality drawn from the Alaska Statute's stated intent. The 
registration and notification requirements do not impose any affirmative disability or restraint 
triggered by criminal behavior on Respondents because they can travel freely and live wherever 
they choose. Furthermore, the Alaska Statute does not impose requirements that are historically 
regarded as punishment because the distribution of public information is not punishment. The 
Alaska Statute docs not promote the traditional punitix e aim of retribution because it does not 
affix culpability to prior conduct or punish past misdeeds. The Alaska Statute does not activate 
solely on a finding of scienter as it imposes its requirements on all convicted sex ofTenders, 
regardless ot mental state. The Alaska Statute does not impose excessive costs in relation to its 
stated purpose of public safety because potential domestic and international audiences receiving 
any Alaska Statute information posted on the Internet are self-limiting, and diminish as their 
distance from Alaska increases.
As a matter of public policy, upholding the constitutionality of the Alaska Statute furthers 
the important societal goal of protecting the public from dangerous sex offenders, and allows a 
uniquely situated state to provide information to its widely-dispersed population.
Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act docs not violate the due process guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court’s past decisions have clearly delineated the scope of 
this protection with respect to the interest contained in an individual’s reputation, and procedural 
guarantees do not apply to the case at bar. This Court has enunciated the “stigma plus” lest to 
determine if a liberty interest in reputation exists and is desen-'ing of constitutional protection. 
The test demands that Respondents demonstrate that (1) the state’s actions falsely stigmatized 
them, and (2) that “as a result of the state action complained of, a right or status previously
9
recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished.” Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 711 
(1976). Respondents' claim fails both parts of this test.
Respondents were not falsely stigmatized by Connecticut's publication of its sex offender 
registry information. It is uncontested that Respondents are convicted sex offenders and that all 
the information contained in the published registr>' is true. There is no defamation when the state 
disseminates true information arising from public criminal proceedings. All injur>' to 
Respondents' reputations How s directl\' from their own criminal misconduct.
In addition, there is no defamator\’ implication made by the publication of the registry'. 
Connecticut's notification provisions apply equally to all registrants on the basis of their 
conviction. There is no dissemination of any information regarding an individual registrant's 
Ie\ el of dangerousness. The website's disclaimer expressly negates any such false inferences.
The Second Circuit also wrongly concluded that sex offender registration requirements 
satisfy the “plus" factor, because they arc uniquely go\'cmmental in nature. This is an incorrect 
interpretation and expansion of the holding in Paul. Under Paul, the terminated right must be a 
result of the act complained of: here, that is the notification provision. Registration is a merely a 
regulatory measure collateral to the criminal conviction. Neither provisions satisfy this Court’s 
del'mition of the “plus” factor.
Accordingly, Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to REVERSE the decisions of the 
Second and Ninth Circuits.
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ARGUMENT
I. ALASKA’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER 
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE BECAUSE ITS EFFECTS ARE CONSISTENT 
WITH ITS STATED NON-PUNITIVE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THE PEOPLE OF 
ALASKA FROM DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS.
The United States Constitution dictates that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any ... ex post 
facto law.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. An ex post facto law is one that "aggravates a crime, or 
makes it greater than it was, when committed. . . . changes the punishment and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." Caldcr v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386.
300 (1798). Nearly one hundred years after the decision in Calder. this Court clarified its 
language, stating more simply that legislatures "may not retroactively alter the definition of 
crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 
(1990). In Collins, the Court set a high standard for Finding an ex post facto violation, holding 
that there could be none where a law merely altered a situation to a party's disadvantage, even if 
the disadvantage involved the deprivation of a substantial right. 497 U.S. at 47 (overruling Knng 
V. Mo.. 107 U.S. 21 (1883) and Thompson v. Utah. 170 U.S. 343 (1898)).
The current test for determining whether a statute retroactively increases the punishment 
for a crime in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause operates in two stages. U.S. v. Ward, 448 
U.S. 242. 248 (1980). The first phase of inquiry examines the legislative history of a statute to 
determine if the legislature either expressly or impliedly indicated a regulatory or punitive intent.
If a court determines that the intent behind a statute was punitive, ex post facto analysis ends 
and the statute is invalidated. See id.; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 169(1963). 
If the legislative intent behind a statute is non-punitive, or even ambiguous, the statute survives 
the crucial first phase of ex post facto inquiry and moves to the next. S^ Ward. 448 U.S. at 248- 
49; Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 169 (stating that an ex post facto inquiry only ends at this
II
early stage when there is “conclusi\ e e\ idence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a 
statute.”). The second phase of ex post facto inquiry seeks to determine whether, even in the 
presence of a stated non-puniti\ c intention, a statute is “so punitive in purpose or effect as to 
negate that intention.” \V^, 448 U.S. at 249. The second stage of inquiry is a difficult one to 
overcome for parlies seeking to invalidate a law, as statutes carry a presumption of 
consliiLiiionalily that can only be overcome by “the clearest proof." Flemminu v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603. 617 (1960), ITirihermore, "it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the 
legislature is to be pronounced to ha\'c transcended its powers.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 U.S. 87, 128 
(1810). The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act {hereinafter “Alaska Statute”) does not 
\ iolate the F\ Post Facto Clause because both its stated intent and its effects are non-punitive.
A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Held That the Lccislative Intent Behind the Alaska
Statute Was l:xpresslv Non-Puniti\ e and Sur\'ivcs the First Stage of Ex Post Facto 
Scrutiny.
The intent behind the Alaska Statute is expressly non-punitive. In determining whether 
the legislative intent of a statute is punitive, courts will first examine the text of the statute, 
followed by other elements that may contain clues as to its puiTiose such as its classification 
within the state codes. Ward. 448 U.S. at 249; Kan, v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
The puipose stated in the text of the Alaska Statute is to “assist in protecting the public safety." 
1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41. The express intent of the Alaska legislature in passing the Alaska 
Statute \s as unmistakably non-punitive. This conclusion was reinforced by the Court of Appeals 
of Alaska, which held that even though the Alaska Statute is classified within Alaska’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure, its intent is non-punitive, as the Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure deals 
with many other, non-punitive aspeets of the criminal process. Patterson v. Alaska, 985 P.2d 
1007, 1012 (Alaska App. 1999). Furthermore, courts have repeatedly stated that the mere 
placement of a sex offender registration act in a state's code of criminal procedure “does not
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necessarily indicate an intent on the part of the legislature to punish sex ofFcndcrs. Cutshall v. 
Sundquist. 193 F.3d466, 474 (6th Cir. 1999): see also Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1077 n.
19 (Del. 2001). However, irrespective of the precise location of the Alaska Statute within the 
state codes the only language actually indicating legislative intent states that its purj^sc is to 
“assist in protecting the public safety.” 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41. The drafters of the Alaska 
Statute could hardly have been more e.xplicit in establishing a non-punitive intent. Under any 
circumstance, the language chosen by the Alaska Legislature at least denies Respondents the 
“conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature” of the Alaska Statute 
necessary to invalidate it based on its intent. Mendoza-Martine/, 372 U.S. at 169. Here, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the court in Patterson, and Petitioners do not contest the court’s 
conclusion that “the legislative intent of the Act is non-punitive.” Otte, 259 I-.3d at 986. 
Therefore, both the language of the Alaska Statute and the case law surrounding it establish its 
non-punitive intent, and it passes to the second phase of ex post facto analysis, where only the 
clearest proof can overcome its attendant presumption of constitutionality. Flemming, 363 U.S. 
at 617. This burden is so great, that even civil confinement statutes, which can effectively 
incarcerate sex offenders beyond their sentences for the remainders of their lives, cannot bear the 
weight. Sec Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
B. The Alaska Statute Cannot Be Construed As Punishment Based on its Effects.
In determining whether the effect of a statute is punitive during the second phase of an e\ 
post facto analysis, this Court traditionally inquires whether a sanction:
(1) Involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) Has historically been regarded as a punishment;
(3) Comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) Operates to promote the traditional aims of punishment;
(5) Applies to behavior that is already a crime;
(6) Could rationally be connected to an alternative, non-punitive purpose; and
(7) Appears excessive in relation to its alternative purpose.
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Mendo7a-Martinc/. 372 U.S. at 168-69. The Court has stated that the seven factors listed in
Mcndo/a-Martinc/ arc “all relevant to the inquiry and may often point in different directions."
Id, at 169. As such, no single factor is dispositive as to a statute's constitutionality, and all must 
be w eighed together. ^ Ward. 448 U.S. at 249. The Ninth Circuit held that three of the seven 
Mendo/.a-Martine/ factors favor treating the Alaska Statute as non-punitive. Otte, 259 F.3d at 
9S9, 991. The Ninth Circuit determined that the effects of the Alaska Statute have not 
historically been regarded as punishment, are not triggered only upon a finding of scienter, and 
that there is a non-punitive puiposc rationally connected to the statute. Id. A proper balancing 
of the seven Mendo/a Martine/ factors reveals little e\idencc, much less the "clearest proof’ 
required to vitiate the Alaska Legislature’s stated intent to institute a non-punitive measure for 
the protection of its cili/ens.
1. The Alaska Statute's registration and notification requirements do not 
impose an affirmative disability or restraint and are not punitive, even 
thoiuzh they are triizgered bv behavior that is already a crirne.
The Alaska Statute’s registration requirement does not impose an affirmative disability or 
restraint on Respondents. For a statute to impose an affirmative restraint, the sanction imposed 
must be severe. 01 Flemmimz. 363 U.S. at 617; Hudson vJJ.S^, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). In 
Flemminu, a non-citizen was deprived of certain Social Security benefits as a result of having 
been previously deported. 363 U.S. at 605. Citing the "‘infimous punishment’ of 
imprisonment" as a counterexample, this Court held that the deprivation of old-age Social 
Security benefits did not impose an affinnative disability or restraint on the plaintiff Id at 617 
tcitingWong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1896)). In Hudson, the plaintiffs were subjected to 
monetary fines and were banned from working in the banking industry because they \'iolated 
federal banking laws. 522 U.S. at 104. This Court held that the sanctions involved did not 
impose an affirmative disability or restraint “as the temi is traditionally understood." Id, Sex
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offender registration requirements in particular are far less onerous than those imposed in 
Hudson. Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474. Here, the requirement that a sex offender appear at one of 
the many police stations in Alaska to register is far less se\'ere than the imposition of a fine or 
even an occupational debarment. In hict, under the Alaska Statute, registered offenders are “free 
to live where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek \\ hatever employment they may 
desire." Femedcer v. Haun. 227 F.3d 1244. 1250 (10th Cir. 2000): see also Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 
474. Therefore, the registration requirement of the Alaska Statute imposes no affirmative 
disability or restraint on Respondents.
The Ninth Circuit erroneously compares the registration requirement of the Alaska 
Statute to “onerous conditions” imposed by probation or supervised release. One, 259 F.3d at 
9S7. The Alaska Statute bears little if any similarity to the requirements of probation, as it 
involves no active supervision, behavioral restrictions, or sanctions for violating such 
restrictions. Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1012. Furthermore, a sex offender registered under the 
.Maska statute “is not required to submit to a search at the request of a probation or parole 
officer, or otherwise comply with the conditions usually attendant on parole release or probation 
supervision." M. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s analogy docs not apply, and the lack of any 
affirmative disability or restraint imposed by the Alaska Statute becomes more apparent.
The Alaska Statute’s notification provisions impose no affirmative disabilities or 
restraints on Respondents. The Ninth Circuit states that community notification over the Internet 
is "likely to make the plaintiffs completely unemployable.” Otte, 259 F.3d at 988. However, any 
such assertion is purely speculative. The Record contains no evidence to support the contention 
that Respondents will be unemployable either in Alaska or abroad because of the notification 
provisions of the Alaska Statute. Rather it is Respondents’ own criminal histories, already
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matters of public record, that might (if at all) affect their employability. Any incidents that might 
cause Respondents difUculty in employment would not be the consequences of the Alaska 
Statute, but rather would be wholly dependent on actions taken by third parties based on the facts 
of Respondents' convictions, information publicly a\'ailable prior to the promulgation of the 
Alaska Statute. Doc v. Pataki. 120F.3d 1263. 1280 (2dCir. 1997). Furthemiore, the posting of 
such information on the Internet still docs not impede Respondents' movements nor prevent 
them from choosing to work in u hates er profession they wish.
The activity triggering the Alaska Statute is undeniably a crime. The Alaska Statute is set 
in motion by an "aggravated sex offense" or a "child kidnapping.” Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100 
(Lexis L. Publg. 2001). This Court has held that when criminal activity triggers a statute, that 
consideration can point toward a finding that a .statute is punitive rather than regulatory in nature. 
\\';irti. 44S ITS. at 249-50. Notwithstanding, this Court has also refused to put significant 
emphasis on this factor, because "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in 
respect to the same act or omission.” Id at 250 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
399 (193S)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit applied the same logic in 
u eighing the constitutionality of a retroactive Megan’s Law, citing the strong connection 
between Internet notiHcation and legitimate civil purposes. See Fcmcdcer, 227 F.3d at 1252. 
Other courts have followed suit, giving little weight to the fact that retroactive Megan's Laws 
apply to behavior that is already criminal. Sec Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1281 (stating that association 
of sex offender registration statute with criminal behavior did not “suffice to transform it into 
punishment”); CutshalL 193 F.3d at 476 (declining to hold that that a state sex offender 
registration statute was transformed from regulatory to punitive even though “the registration and 
notification provisions are intertwined with the offender's underlying conviction”). This Court
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should apply the same logic here. Even though the Alaska Statute is triggered by criminal 
acti\'ity. it should be accorded only minimal weight because of "the equally strong connection 
between notification and legitimate civil purposes,” namely, the protection of the public from 
sexual predators. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252-53.
Neither the registration nor the notification provisions ot the Alaska Statute act as an 
alfirmaiive disability or restraint upon Respondents, and the fact that criminal acts trigger the 
provisions can be of only minimal value to attempts to demonstrate otherwise. Thus, the factors 
together show that the Alaska statute is non-punitive. In fact, both the lack of afllrniative 
di-sability or restraint, and the minimal weight of Respondents’ criminal acts as triggers for the 
Alaska Statute, highlight the absence of precisely that “clearest proof’ of punitive effect 
necessary to establish a \ iolation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
2. The Alaska Statute imposes requirements that are not historically regarded 
as nunishment and that do not promote its traditional aims.
History does not regard sex offender registration and notification or analogous 
requirements as punishment. The historical shaming punishments of the colonial period, such as 
banishment, pillory, or requiring the wearing of the proverbial scarlet letter were punishments 
because all involved more than the dis.semination of public information. Ft.B. v. Verniero, 119 
F.3d 1077, 1099 (3d Cir. 1997). Such colonial practices inflicted punishment “because they 
either held the person up before his or her fellow citizens for shaming or physically removed him 
or her from the community.” Id, The shaming punishments of the past have been regarded as 
such precisely because they “were intended to and did visit society’s wrath directly upon the 
offender.” Russell v. Gregoire. 124F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting VCRvJ^onlz, 931 
F. Supp. 1199, 1217(D.N.J. 1996)).
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Courts have specifically held that sex offender registration and notification requirements 
are quite unlike the scarlet letter of yester>'ear, and they are not analogous to such historical 
Nhaming punishments. It is acknowledged that circulating information about criminal activity 
has always carried potential negative consequences for those implicated in that activity, but 
nc\ crtheless, “dissemination of sucii information in and of itselt. . . has never been regarded as 
punishment w hen done in furtherance of a legitimate govemmental interest. Vemiero. 119 F.3d 
at 1099-1100. fart ol'the logic in this reasoning rests in the inherently public nature of the 
American legal system. The American criminal justice system necessarily insists on keeping its 
proceedings public, and every conviction becomes a matter of public record. at 1100. 
Depending on the crime in\'ol\'ed, and the circumstances surrounding it. a con\iction and its 
accompanying proceedings may receive widespread media attention, independent of any 
attempts to control publicity. Id, The public nature of the proceedings is all that is needed to 
Mibject a convicted defendant to potentially adverse consequences in employment and personal 
relationships, regardless of any later dissemination of that information by go\ernment agencies. 
Id, What separates sex offender registration and notification from the humiliation punishments 
of old is that such negative consequences are not inevitable. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092 {citing 
font/. 931 1-. Supp at 1217). Adverse impacts can often be a\oidcd because sex offender 
registration and notification requirements do not mandate a direct confrontation between the 
offender and members of the public. See Russel], 124 F.3d at 1091.
Sex offender notification is more akin to “wanted" posters and other public advisories 
issued by states and the federal government to protect the community than it is to Hawthorne’s 
scarlet letter. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092. Such posters and warnings are historically regarded as 
non-punitive even though they “disclose essentially the same information [as a statutory
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notification requirement], may rouse public excitement, and may carry a greater risk of 
viailantism." Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. The Alaska Statute fits the mold of such government 
advisories because it merely “prov ides for the collection and dissemination of information." 
which has not historically been considered punishment. CutshaU, 193 F.3d at 475. The Alaska 
Statute docs not inflict punishment because it docs not follow the additional steps taken in 
colonial shaming punishments to force offenders into embarrassing or humiliating confrontations 
with the public such as placing them in the stocks or an iron cage. Moreover, any shame that 
might result from the disclosure of sex offender registry information “is certainly not the clearest 
proof nccessar>' to overcome the legislative intent that the [statute] serve regulatory and non 
punitive punioses.” Id, at 475. The Ninth Circuit's analysis on this point is consistent with that 
of the Third and Sixth Circuits in holding that the Alaska Statute is “not analogous to historical 
shaming punishments," and therefore non-punitivc on that score. Otte, 259 F.3d at 989.
The Alaska Statute does not promote retribution or deterrence, the traditional aims of 
punishment. Retributive statutes affix culpability for prior conduct or seek to punish past 
misdeeds. Sec Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362. In Hendricks, this Court held that a civil 
commitment statute ordering the commitment of various classes of sexual offenders did not 
promote the aim of retribution for ex post facto puiposes because it did not “affix culpability lor 
prior criminal conduct," but instead used the evidence of prior conduct for non-punitivc 
purposes, kf (citing Allen v. 111., 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986)). There, the statute at issue was held 
“non-punitive even though it was triggered by a sexual assault.” Id, Such is the case here. The 
Alaska Statute does not establish a procedure to affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. 
Rather, the Alaska Statute simply uses evidence of prior conduct for a non-punitive purpose, 
namely, the legislature’s stated purpose of notifying and protecting the public. Furthermore, the
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retributive sentiments of the public with relation to the conditions imposed by a statute may not
be ascribed to the legislature without evidence. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1283. The record contains no 
es idence that vengeful or retributive public sentiment guided the drafting of the Alaska Statute. 
As a result, the Alaska Statute cannot be said to promote the aim of retribution.
The Alaska Statute does not promote the aim of detcirence. An individual who is 
undeterred from committing a felonious se.\ua! assault or kidnapping, despite the risk of 
enduring the w orst of society's criminal penalties such as life imprisonment or even death, w ould 
not likely be deterred by potential for additional registration and notification requirements upon 
release from prison.' However, even if this Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit and determines 
that the Alaska Statute does promote some degree of deterrence, such dctemiination is not 
dispositive of whether the Alaska Statute is punitive because deterrence can serve civil as well as 
criminal goals. ^ U.S. Urserv, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996). Any dcteiTcnt effect of the Alaska 
Statute is non-punitivc, as it serves the stated legitimate purpose of protecting the public. 
Therefore, the Alaska Statute docs not promote cither of the traditional aims of punishment: 
retribution and deterrence.
3. The Alaska Statute does not come into play only on a finding of scienter.
Iix post f acto inquiry further fa\ ors the constitutionality of the Alaska Statute because a 
finding of scienter docs not trigger its provisions. Black’s Law' Dictionary defines scienter as 
■tlie fact of an act’s having been done know ingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal 
punishment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1347 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed.. West 1999). In 
Hendricks, this Court held that if the action triggering a civil commitment statute w'ere one that
‘ White a death sentence might be imposed in other states, depending on the crime committed, 
Alaska abolished the death penalty in 1957. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State 
Death Penalty Information. States Without the Death Penalty 
^htip:'/w WAV.deathpenaltyinfo.org/nodp.html> (accessed Oct. 22, 2002).
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Id In Hudson, this Court elaborated, stressing that a statute tends to be punitive when a 
"sanction comes into play ‘only' on a finding of scienter." 522 U.S. at 104. In that case, the 
Court upheld monetary penalties and occupational debannenls that were assessed against anyone 
who violated certain banking statutes, "without regard to the violator's slate ot mind." Id Thus, 
w hen a statute applies regardless of the presence of scienter in the triggering e\ ent. it should be 
construed as non-punitive. Such is the case with the Alaska Statute. Scienter is not necessary to 
trigger the notification and registration requirements of the Alaska Statute. Rather, the 
notification and registration requirements apply to all convicted se.\ offenders in the state, 
without regard to the state of mind of the offender. Therefore, the pro\ isions of the Alaska 
Statute do not come into play only on a finding of scienter and thus ex post facto analysis tilts 
further in favor of finding the registration and notification requirements non-punitive.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the provisions of the Alaska Statute do not come 
into play solely on a finding of scienter. However, rather than focusing its scienter analysis on 
the provisions of the statute itself, the court incorrectly looked to the requirements of the 
underlying offenses in making its determination. Ottc. 259 T.3d at 989. The Ninth Circuit's 
proper inquiry into scienter as the trigger for requirements of the Alaska Statute should have 
determined “whether the challenged statute contained a scienter requirement on its face, rather 
than by looking at the offenses underlying an individual’s classification as a sex offender.” 
Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1251 (citing Hudson. 522 U.S. at 104-05). While the Ninth Circuit's 
conclusion is the correct one in this case, its examination of the underlying offenses is 
inconsistent wdth this Court’s analysis in Hudson and should be corrected to prevent confusion m
required scienter, it would weigh in favor of finding that the statute was punitive. 521 U.S. at
362. The absence of such a requirement is evidence that a statute is not intended to be punitive.
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the future. To allow the Ninth Circuit's analysis to remain unchanged as to this Mendoza:
Martinez factor would result in a drastic change to ex post facto jurisprudence. By looking to the 
presence of scienter in the underlying oflense rather than the face of the challenged statute itself, 
most crimes would have a greater immunity from mechanical or procedural alterations in their 
post-cons iction administration. The Ninth Circuit’s scienter analysis unjustly affords greatci ex 
post facto protection to convicted murderers, burglars, and even petty thieves than it docs to sex 
offenders because the former tlirce classes of criminals commit crimes that require scienter.
Thus, an ex post facto analysis of the elTects of any changes to the post-conviction administration 
of their cases would automatically weigh towards being punitive and thus be more likely to 
\ iolate the Tx Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Certain sex offenses, however, aie subject 
to strict liability, and therefore an ex post facto inquiry using the Ninth Circuit s brand of scienter 
analysis would never result in a finding that a challenged statute was punitive based on an 
underlying requirement of scienter. Therefore, Petitioners agree with the Ninth Circuit s 
conclusion that scienter docs not trigger the provisions of the Alaska Statute, but respectfully 
request that this Court uphold the Ninth Circuit's conclusion regarding this point based on the 
face of the Alaska Statute rather than the underlying offenses triggering its provisions.
4 The Alaska Statute is rationally connected to the non-punitive purpose of 
public safety and is not excessive in relation to that purpose.
Respondents concede, and the Ninth Circuit agrees, that the Alaska Statute is rationally 
connected to the non-punitive purpose of public safety. One, 259 F.3d at 991. Statutes are tested 
liizhtly on the issue of whether a non-punitive purpose can be attributed to a statute, as all that 
need be shown is whether a non-punitive purpose can be ^ rationally connected to the 
consequences.’' Fcmedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. The language of the Alaska Statute itself draws the 
connection between public safety and its provisions. The Alaska Legislature explicitly stated
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that the “release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general 
public will assist in protecting public safety." 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41.
The Alaska Statute is not excessive in relation to its stated puiposc. In its Mendoza- 
Martinez analysis of the effects of the Alaska Statute, the Ninth Circuit found the excessiveness 
factor “highly significant” in finding the Alaska Statute to be punitive. Ottc, 259 F.3d at 991.
The Ninth Circuit also makes much of the potential for wide dissemination of the personal 
information of registrants under the Alaska Statute. Id. at 992-93. However, the exccssi\ eness 
factor cannot be given too much weight in a coun’s ex post facto analysis, as this Court held: “no 
one factor should be considered controlling.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101. In Hudson, this Court 
stated that such analysis was “ill considered” and “unworkable,” and made a point of overruling 
U.S. v. Halocr. 490 U.S. 435 (1989), because it elevated considerations of excessiveness above 
all others. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02. The Tenth Circuit applied similar reasoning in 
Femcdeer, stating that “a statute is not necessarily excessive for purposes of this [Mendoza- 
Marlinezl factor simply because a state has perhaps not achieved a perfect fit between ends and 
means.” 227 F.3d at 1253. Furthermore, the court in Femedcer points out that Internet 
notification may not result in distribution to a very wide audience, because as the distance from 
the state increases, so too does interest in the sex offender database. The Court should apply 
the same logic here. The potential global audience for information on the Alaska website is sell- 
limiting. The further away from Alaska a potential audience is located, the less interest that 
audience w'ill have in the information available on the Alaska website. Sec id. Moreover, the 
Alaska w'ebsile is passive. Information can only be obtained by Internet users who actively 
locate and the access the website. This requires Internet users to lake active measures, such as 
contacting the Alaska Department of Public Safety directly or using an Internet search engine to
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obtain the website address. When the requirement of affirmative attempts to locate the Alaska 
website is considered together with the decreased interest in its content as distance from Alaska 
increases, the likelihood of global dissemination of registrants’ information decreases drastically. 
The Alaska website is essentially hidden behind a curtain, and Internet users must actively locate 
and pull back that curtain before accessing the information in the registry. Since there is so little 
likelihood of anyone outside Alaska peering behind that curtain, the Alaska Statute should not be 
found excessive in relation to its stated purjwse. If the Couti does find the Alaska Statute to be 
excessive, it is not so excessive that, standing alone, it provides the level of proof necessary to 
render it a punitive factor under Mcndoza-Mailincz.
In summary, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that three of the se\ cn Mendoza- 
Martine/ factors point in favor of Petitioners. Of the remaining four factors, none cany' 
sufficient weight so as to provide the clearest proof that the Alaska Statute violates the Ex Post 
l-acto Clause of the Constitution. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Most of the Mendoza- 
■Martinev factors actually support the presumption of constitutionality of the Alaska Statute under 
the Hx Post Facto Clause. Therefore, this Court should find that the Alaska Statute is 
constitutional and grant summary judgment in favor of Petitioner.
C. Public Policy Supports the Reeistration and Notification Requirements of the 
Alaska Statute.
All states have sex ofTendcr registration and notification statutes, and Megan’s Law has 
its ow n independent registration requirement. The prevalence of these statutes and their 
ON'crwhelming support by the courts demonstrates a strong public policy favoring the use of 
registration and notification statutes in general. Alaska is a state that has a particular need for an 
effective sex offender registration statute such as the one already in place. Alaska is the largest 
of the United States in area. Alaska is sparsely populated, and its population density is the
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lowest of any of the fifty states. Alaska’s population also includes a disproportionately high 
number of sex offenders. Taken together, these facts demonstrate that where most states can 
achieve adequate notification by posting flyers or by mail, it would be too slow, too costly, and 
too ineffective to use the same methods in Alaska, where the need for notification is greater. 
Notification via the Internet affords Alaska residents, many of whom live in isolated and remote 
areas, the same level of notice that they would receive in other, more densely populated states 
that use traditional methods.
II. CONNECTICUT’S SEX OFEENDER REGISTRATION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE BECAUSE ONLY TRUE; PUBLIC 
INfORMATION IS PUBLISHED AND NO TANGIBLE LEGAL INTEREST IS 
TERMINATED.
A state may not deprive a person of liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983. such a deprivation of procedural rights may be 
vindicated in court. Procedural due process questions begin with an examination of whether a 
recognized liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State. Kv. Bd. of 
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Protected liberty interests may derive from 
cither the Due Process Clause itself or the laws of the States, [d I lowever, the range of interests 
protected by procedural due process is not without limitation, jd.
This Court has set forth a two-part inquiry, the “stigma plus” lest, for determining if a 
liberty interest exists in one’s reputation and whether it is deserving of due process guarantees. 
Paul V. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). As a threshold issue. Respondents must show that 
government action imposed a loss of reputation, or “stigma,” upon them under color of law. Id. 
at 696-97. Generally, this type of injury only gives rise to a standard claim of defamation, 
actionable in any state court. Paul. 424 U.S. at 697. Defamation alone, even if inflicted by state 
officials, does not result in a deprivation of a protected liberty interest and is not actionable under
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42U.S.C.§ 1983. PaaL424 U.S.at7l2. Under the second step of the analysis. Respondents 
must further demonstrate a “plus" factor by show ing that the government action complained of. 
"distinctly altered or extinguished" a right or status previously protected under state law. Id. at 
711. Without an implication of some more tangible interest, or “plus” factor, such a claim fails 
to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause. Id at 701. Here, the 
Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act neither falsely stigmatizes Respondents nor 
extinguishes their legal rights. Therefore, Respondents' claim fails both parts of the "stigma 
plus" te.st. and there is no Due Process Clause violation.
A. There Is No False Stiema Created bv the Publication of True Information in 
Coniunction With an Express Disclaimer.
Connecticut's sex offender registry' only disseminates true information about registrants, 
lor a go\*ernmental action to infringe upon the “reputation, honor, or integrity of a person, it 
must invoh’c the publication of information that is substantially and materially false. Codd v. 
Wbjcr, 429 U.S. 624, 627-29 (1977). Considering the nature of the interest at stake, the absence 
of any factual dispute as to the substantial truth of the material in question, destroys any claim 
for procedural due process. Id. at 627. In Codd, the Court held that even if the plaintiff w'as 
indeed stigmatized by government action, the fact that the information was substantially true 
precluded any due process claim. Id at 628-29. The gravamen of a stigmatization due process 
claim is that a hearing should be afforded “solely to clear one’s name.” Id Thus, where the 
published information is truthful, no hearing can achieve such a result, and accordingly, no 
hearing is due. id
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1. No defamation results from the publication of accurate public record
information about Respondents* past criminal convictions.
The publication of true information in a sex offender registry, while potentially damaging 
to one's reputation, is not defamatory. Helman. 784 A.2d at 1071. In Helman. a convicted sex 
offender subject to Delaware's registration and community notification law sought to invoke the 
Delaware Constitution’s express protection afforded to an individual's reputation. Id, at 1070- 
71. The Delaware Supreme Court recognized the constitutionally grounded protection against 
defamation, but held that no defamation had occurred. Id, The information published by the 
Stale was truthful and public, identifying the registrant by name, address and crime. Id, at 1071. 
Therefore, the notification was not defamatory, even if damaging. Id, The court concluded that 
stale-directed disclosure of information arising from criminal prosecutions did not constitute an 
infringement of a protected interest. Id
It is widely recognized that the social consequences that flow from a criminal conviction 
are considerable. U.S. v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). aff'd in part, re\''d in nart on 
other izrounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Virtually all individuals who are convicted of serious crimes 
suffer humiliation and shame, and many may be ostracized by their communities. M, However, 
such reputational injuries are not consequences imposed by sex offender registry publication.
Doe V. Pataki, 120F.3d 1263, 1280 (2d Cir. 1997). Most information contained in the registrx' 
was available prior to the enactment of such registration statutes, id Rather, the effects of 
public notification result essentially from a registrant's underlying criminal conviction. Id
Any injury to reputation caused by sex offender notification flows most directly from the 
offender's own misconduct, i.e. the underlying conviction. Lanni v. Enuler. 994 F. Supp. 849. 
855 (E.D. Mich. 1998). In Lanni. registrants under Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act 
claimed, inter alia, that the act’s notification provisions were defamatory and violated their
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procedural due process rights. Lanni. 994 F. Supp at 855. However, the court found that any ill 
elTecis to reputation were only tangentially related to state conduct. Id. The court reasoned that 
because the registration act merely compiled and disseminated truthful, public information, any 
iiijur\ to reputation resulted directly from the criminal conviction and private citizens’ reaction 
thereto. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the registrants were not entitled to due process 
protection from the disclosure of true information. Id.
Respondents do not contend that any information contained in the registry is false or 
olherw ise inaccurate, including their underlying sex offense convictions. As in Helman and 
Lanni. the registry's publication only makes available truthful, public information such as name, 
address and crime. As a matter of law, the di.sclosure of information arising from Respondents* 
criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and not defamator>'. Cf Helman. 784 A.2d at 
1071. Indeed, in the case at bar this point is true, a fortiori, because unlike in Helman. there is no 
express constitutional protection for Respondents’ reputation. Moreover, any injur>’ to reputation 
How s directly from Respondents' prior convictions, not the subsequent dissemination of that 
information. Lanni. 994 F. Supp. at 849.
2. The Connecticut registry’s express disclaimer specifically negates any
defamatory inference.
Any defamatory implication must be present in the plain and natural meaning of the 
words used. Chapin v. Kniuht-Ridder. Inc.. 993 F.2d 1087, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993). Because the 
constitution provides “sanctuary for truth,” Respondents must make an “especially rigorous” 
showing of the implied defamation where the facts are literally true. Id at 1093. The language 
must not only be reasonably read to impart the false inference, but it must also affirmatively 
show that the author intends the defamatory inference. Chapin. 993 F.2d at 1093 (citing White v. 
Fraternal Order of Police. 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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Respondents admit the registry's truth, but contend it implies a false defamatory 
inference. That is. Respondents assert that community notification stigmatizes them as cuiTenily 
dangerous sex offenders. However, the online registry makes no statement that any particular 
registrant is currently dangerous. In fact, the front page of the registry’s website contains a 
disclaimer, stating that the Department of Public Safety “has made no determination that any 
individual included in this Rcgistr\' is currently dangerous," and that “[i]ndividiials included 
w ithin the registry are included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law." (J.A.
31.) The disclaimer goes on to infonn the viewer that the "main purjiosc" of the website is “to 
make the information more easily available . .. and not to warn about any specific individual."
31.)
The Second Circuit coirectly recognized that Respondents' contention that publication of 
the registry implied, as a matter of law, that every person listed was a currently dangerous sex 
offender was highly dubious. Doe v. Conn. Dept, of Pub. Safety, 271 l■.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2001). 
After all. the registry is nothing more than a list of “«// offenders con\’ictcd of the covered 
crimes." Id. The undifferentiated nature of the registry simply does not imply that any particular 
indi\ idual is cuiTcntly dangerous, and the disclaimer enforces this notion. Id.
Any claim of defamation by implication must be capable of being proven false. Here, the 
rcgistr>' makes no implied assertion that can be pro\ cn false. Whether a particular registrant will 
commit a future offense is unknown and unpro\ ablc, and the registry explicitly denies making 
such an assertion in its disclaimer. See Vemiero. ll9F.3dat 1108 (citing studies that concluded 
generally that mental health professionals were not capable of predicting future dangerousness). 
In addition, despite the Second Circuit’s deduction that the general legislative intent of the 
Connecticut Statute forces a defamatory implication, the disclaimer specifically states that the
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B. The Provisions of the Connecticut Statute Do Not Implicate Any Tangible
Interests That Constitute a Plus Factor under Paul v. Davis.
F.ven where stigmatization has occuiTcd. this Court has repeatedly emphasized that no 
constitutional doctrine e.xists to transform every dcTimation by a state actor into a deprivation of 
a liberty interest. Paul. 424 U.S. at 702. I hider the reasoning of Paul, there exists only a narrow 
hand of tangible interests sufficient to trigger due process protections. Id. at 711. A line ot this 
C’ourt's decisions has funily established that such “plus" factors are only present where “as a 
result of the state action complained of. a right or status previously recognized by state law was 
distinctly altered or exlingiii.shed." Id.
Despite the damaging effect of the “stigma" w hich may result from government 
defamation, “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment,” is 
neither liberty nor properly w orthy of due process protection. Id. at 701. The government's 
jiLiblic designation of indi\ iduals w ith stigmatizing labels “does not directly deprive anyone of 
liberty or property." .loint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm, v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951). 
The stigma of government branding docs not in itself destroy any legal right or immunity. Id. at 
1 S3-84. Any such claim of injury relates to sanctions applied by public disapproval, not by law. 
Iji The Paul Court recognized that in McGrath, a majority of the Justices had rejected the notion 
that a government imposed "stigma" could invoke due process guarantees without a direct effect 
on a legal status. Paul. 424 U.S. at 704-05.
This Court has repeatedly reinforced this line of reasoning. ^ e^ Wieman v, 
I’pdeeraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (refusing to pass on procedural due process claim where state 
workers were stigmatized as “disloyal”); Cafeteria Workers v. McElrov. 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (no
intent of the online registry is to facilitate access to public information. The registr>'’s stated
purpose simply does not support any inferential suggestions regarding dangerousness.
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due process violation where government discharge bestowed a badge of infamy but without an 
attendant foreclosure of other employment). Most recently, in Sieueil v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 
(1991), this Court again reiterated the teachings of Paul. Although the case was resolved on 
qualified immunity grounds, the Court re-emphasized that the plaintiff could not state a due 
process claim without showing that the stigma resulted in a something more than an 
“impair[ment]” of future employment prospects, kl at 234. So long as the damage sustained 
flows from an injury to reputation, it may be recoverable under state toil law. but is not 
reco\ erablc in a constitutional action. Id.
1. The registration provision cannot establish a plus factor because it is not
the state action uiviim rise to the alleged stiuma.
Under Paul, this Court held that the requisite plus factor must arise "as a result of the 
state action complained of" Paul. 424 U.S. at 711. Stated another way, the injury to reputation 
and the loss of a tangible interest must originate from the same governmental act. See id. In the 
case at bar, the stigmatizing governmental action complained of is the Connecticut Act's public 
notification provisions. Respondents argue that the Connecticut Act’s public notification 
provisions impliedly stigmatize them, harming their interest in reputation. Yet, they do not 
contend that the notification provisions establish a plus factor. Rather, Respondents allege the 
registration provisions satisfy the plus requirement. Accordingly, their claim must fail because 
the public notification elements of the Connecticut Statute are the only portions that can trigger 
due process protection under Paul.
The Paul Court clarified this causal principle in its analysis of Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau. 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), which had stated that due process guarantees come 
into play where “a good person’s name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what 
the government is doing to him.” The Court of Appeals misinterpreted this phrase to mean that
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go\ emment defamation, without more, could invoke due process protection. Paul. 424 U.S. at 
"OS. This Court rejected that reading, noting that such an interpretation would result in a 
signillcant broadening of its previous holdings. Id Rather, the linchpin of Constantineau lay in 
the fact that a deprivation resulted "because of what the government is doing to him.” Id This 
relerred to the fact that the go\ ernment action taken, i.e. public notification, deprived the 
indi\ idual of a right previously held under state law. Id In Constantineau. it was the posting of 
defamatory llyers that caused the reputational injury, and it was the posting that altered the 
jdaintiffs pre\ iously protected status. Id
The Paul Court buttressed this conclusion \ ia an analysis of its decision in Bd. of Reecnts 
\ . Roth. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth recognized that govcmmental defamation in the course of 
denying a person continuing employment, could entitle them to due process of law. Paul. 424 
I '.S. at 709. Howexer, in that case, the stale did not impose upon the plaintiff a “stigma or other 
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id 
(quoting Roth. 408 U.S. at 573). Thus, the defamation had to occur in the course of the 
termination of employment, and had to result in a foreclosure of the ability to secure future 
emplo> inent. Id at 710.
The Second Circuit incorrectly concluded that the Connecticut Statute's registration 
requirement could be considered as a plus factor. This Court’s precedent demonstrates that the 
loss of a tangible interest and the injury to reputation must originate from the same governmental 
act. The relationship between the duty to register and the harm caused by any possible 
defamation is simply too attenuated. While it is true that registration process provides some of 
the disseminated information, it is the notification that allegedly causes the injury to reputation. 
Thus, the notification must also be the act that causes a deprivation of some other right. As the
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2. Neither the notification nor reeistration provisions of the Connecticut
Statute rise to the level of depri\ation sufllcient to imnlicate due process
concerns.
Community notification of sex offender registry information does not impose any burden 
that docs not flow from a sullied reputation. Publicly designating convicted sex offenders as 
such, does not “depri\e them of any legal right or immunity.” See McGrath, 341 U.S. 123. 181- 
83 (1951). Publication of the registry does not subject sex offenders to legal prosecution, 
punishment, or by operation of law prohibit them from carrying on any activities. See id. 
Although registrants’ information is subject to widespread notification, “they are nevertheless 
free to li\ c where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek whatever employment they 
may desire.” Fcmcdecr, 227 F.3d at 1250 (holding that Utah’s sex offender notification law did 
not work an affirmative disability on registrants). The consequences which fiow from the 
registry’s dissemination flow directly from public opinion in response to the taint of criminal 
conviction. This is mere defamation, which the Court has never held to be sufficient absent an 
accompanying loss of rights. Paul. 424 U.S. at 706.
The Connecticut Act’s registration provisions also do not extinguish any legal right or 
status sufficient to constitute a plus factor. A registrant is still “free to live where he chooses, 
come and go as he pleases, and seek any employment he wishes.” Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 474. 
The duty to register is a collateral consequence of conviction, not a restraint on liberty. 
Williamson v. Greeoire. 151 F.3d 1180, 1184(9thCir. 1998). Rather, the registration provisions
Paul Court stressed with respect to its interpretations of Constantineau and Roth, a plus factor is
implicated only where a tangible legal interest is extinguished “as a result of’ what the
government is doing to him. The registration provision is not the govenimental action
complained of, as required under Paul. Accordingly. Respondents' claim fails to satisfy the plus
factor clement.
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ac{ merely as cis il regulation, akin to the loss of the right to vote, own firearms, or possess a 
professional license - each of which is beyond the scope of due process considerations, but are 
far more onerous than a simple duty to register. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183. Indeed, the 
burden of registration is far less harsh than a loss of profession or benefits. Artwav v. Attv. 
(ieneral of N.J.. 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3dCir. 1996). Registration is a mere regulatory obligation, 
w hich takes it out of due process concerns. See Williamson. 151 F.3d at 1184; Russell. 124F.3d 
at 1092 (holding that se.\ offender registration requirements are regulatory’ or remedial).
At its core, the instant case is similar to the situation in Paul. In Paul, the plainlilTsought 
constitutional protection from the consequences of slate disclosure of his an'est and law 
enforcement's assessment that he was a continuing risk. 424 U.S. at 695-98. So too. 
Respondents .seek constitutional protection from the consequences of disclosure of their 
com actions and the state's judgment that they pose continuing risks. See V^emiero. 119 F.3d at 
1103. It follows that like the plaintiff in Paul. Respondents ai'e not entitled to due process 
pr otection for an injuiy' to reputation. Yet. here. Respondents’ call for procedural protection is 
e\ en less justifiable.
In Paul, the plaintiff's shoplifting arrest was made by store security -not even police- and 
he w as newer prosecuted on the siioplifting charge. 424 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Local law enforcement then made an informal decision to brand him as an “active shoplifter” 
w ithout a coLii’t's determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 718. Indeed, Justice Brennan’s 
dis.sent in Paul is fundamentally an attack on the possibility that the government might judge an 
individual guilty of a criminal offense without properly convincing a factfinder of his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 724-25. According to Justice Brennan, an interest in 
reputation has conci'cte protection via the presumption of innocence given in the criminal justice
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system. Paul, 424 U.S. at 724. Such constitutional safeguards exist to prevent condemnation of 
an individual when there is doubt as to his guilt. Id. Here, sex offender registrants have been 
Judged guilty in a court of law. The presumption of their innocence is gone. Respondents are 
subject to registration and notification requirements per the Legislature’s directive: on the basis 
of their conviction.
3. The Second Circuit’s definition of a plus factor is overbroad and inimical 
to values of federalism.
This Court has emphatically denied the proposition that a state law claim could be 
transmuted into a constitutional action, simply because a state actor inflicted a wrong “under 
color of law.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 699. To embrace such a line of rea.soning would be an affront to 
the \ alues of federalism. Id. at 698-99. The aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment against the 
conduct of stale officials is not unlimited, for it does not alter the basic relations betw een the 
state and federal governments. Id. at 700. Justice Douglas made this point clear when he bluntly 
stated that “the fact that [a person] is assaulted, injured or even murdered by state officials, docs 
not necessarily mean that he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution.” 
Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 108-09 (1945). The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be understood 
to make all torts of state ofTicials into federal claims. Id at 109. The mere indication of unique 
government involvement under color of law' is not enough to show the presence of a plus factor. 
Such a reading contravenes this Court’s teachings and would serve to make the Fourteenth 
Amendment “a font” of federal tort law to be superimposed upon the states. Paul. 424 U.S. at 
701.
In the case at bar, the Second Circuit’s holding amounts to a significant broadening of the 
language in Paul, in its definition of a plus factor sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause. 
Here, the Court of Appeals disaggregated the plus factor as defined by Paul, requiring only a
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concurrent temporal link between the defamator\' statement and an action “governmental in 
nature.” Doe. 271 F.3d at 56. Thus, according to the Second Circuit, all Respondents must do to 
establish a plus factor is “point to an indicium of material government involvement unique to the 
government's public role.” Id. Supposedly, this distinction serves to differentiate Respondents' 
claim from a traditional state-law defamation action. Id. However, this “distinction” is 
subsumed in the very' definition of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 focuses on 
the misuse of power made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed in government 
authority. U.S. w Classic. 313 U.S. 299. 326 (1941). Thus, such a claim will always entail some 
"indicium" of government involvement. The Second Circuit’s reasoning severs the relationship 
between the go\ernmcnt action that causes the harm, and any resulting deprivation of rights.
1 nder the Second Circuit’s definition, even the plaintitTin Paul could establish a plus factor.
M‘t. as this Court held, there was no plus factor present in that case. Thus, the Second Circuit's 
plus factor test is overbroad and incongruent w ith this Court's decision in Paul.
The Second Circuit also erred by resting its holding on a flaw’cd interpretation of Parrat \. 
Ta\ lor. 45 I U.S. 527 (1981), ovcmilcd in nart on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327 (1986); sec Doc, 271 F.3d at 55. In Parrat, this Court held that no due process violation 
oecLirrcd where state prison officials negligently deprived an inmate of his property rights. 451 
U.S. at 541-44. The Coui1 echoed the holding of Paul, stating that to permit constitutional suits 
based on random or unauthorized state action under color of law would turn the Fourteenth 
Amendment into a font of federal tort law'. Parrat. 451 U.S. at 544. The holding in Parrat is 
consonant with Paul, but it does not equate to an expansion of the definition of the plus factor. 
Parrat does not stand for the proposition that only random and unauthorized state actions are 
barred from due process suits.
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Similarly, the Second Circuit's reliance on Sieeert, is also unfounded. S^ Doe. 271 F.3d 
at 54-55. The Court in Siegert held that even a malicious defamation resulting in an impairment 
of future employment prospects did not establish the presence of a plus factor. 500 U.S. at 234. 
Siegert demands, as does every § 1983 action, some non-trivial state im olvement that removes 
the plaintiff's complaint from the realm of state tort law. Id. at 233. However, the case did not 
turn on this point, but rather on the fact that the alleged defamation was not made incident to the 
termination of the plaintiffs employment, id. at 234. Again, the Court's holding in Siegen is 
consistent with Paul, but it does not imply that the presence of some non-trivial, non-arbitrary 
go\ ernment action is determinative of a plus factor’s existence. Indeed, the holding of that case 
further weakens the Second Circuit’s proposition that the government action that extinguishes a 
legal right can somehow be independent from the defamatory act.
C. Compelling Public Policy Interests Justify Connecticut's Sex Offender
Registration Act Provisions.
Protecting our communities from victimi/ation at the hands of sex offenders is a problem 
of grave seriousness for all .states. It is undeniable that a strong slate interest exists in 
implementing programs that will alleviate such a threat and promote public safety. As the rape 
and murder of Megan Kanka demonstrates, sex offenders released back into the community must 
be taken into account in any stale’s public safety initiatives. The federal and state governments 
have looked to compulsory registration and notification measures for convicted sex offenders as 
a way to aid law enforcement and the public in general in preventing further sex crime tragedies. 
All fifty states and the federal government have promulgated sex offender registration and 
notification laws. The overwhelming legislative support for such measures evinces the 
compelling state interest in their continued implementation. The courts’ support for registration 
and notification statutes further shows a strong public policy favoring their use. Sec Doe v.
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With these public safety concerns in mind, it is not unreasonable for convicted sex 
offenders to have a diminished expectation of due process rights. Once society makes a valid 
determination of guilt, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly. Ford v. Wainw riaht. 
477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Convicted sex 
olTenders have been judged guilty. remo\ ing the presumption of innocence, which influences any 
determination of procedural unfairness. Logan, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1167, 1217 
(1999). Indeed, this Court's decisions establish that “there is no continuum of due process rights 
l equiring \'arying lc\ els of process at every stage in the criminal system.” Ohio Adult Parole 
■Authority v. Woodard. 523 U.S. 272, 283 (1998). On the basis of their convictions for sex 
offenses. Respondents should have a lower expectation of due process rights with respect to 
registration and notification.
Respondents elaim that notification leads to harsh results, including threats, ostracism, 
harassment, and vigilantism. The courts have recognized that notification may well subject 
offenders to humiliation, public opprobrium, ostracism, and the loss of job opportunities. E.g. 
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. However, the potential ostracism and opprobrium that may result 
from notification is not inevitable, as it was with the person whipped, pilloried or branded in 
public. Id The courts have also emphasized that an inquiry into the law's effects cannot 
consider the possible "vigilante" or illegal responses of citizens to notification. Id Such action 
is expressly discouraged in the notification itself and will be prosecuted by the state. (J.A. 31.)
I\)rit7. 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (the state has a substantial and compelling interest in
public disclosure of sex offender registries, which outweighs pri\ acy rights). The weighty
considerations of public safety amply justif>' the Connecticut Act's registration and notification
pro\ isions.
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from vigilantism. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092.
On the basis of these significant policy considerations, this Court should not act to 
prevent the state from disseminating truthful and potentially life-saving information to its 
citizens. To do so would work against the already difncult task of protecting our communities 
from dangerous sexual predators.
Indeed, courts must presume that law enforcement will obey the law and will piotect otfenders
CONCLUSION
The holdings of the Ninth and Second Circuits are out of step with this Court s decisions 
on both ex post facto and due process issues, as both circuits misapplied the juridical principles 
established by this Court's precedent. The Ninth Circuit erred in construing Alaska's Sex 
Offender Registration Act as a violation of constitutional safeguards against ex post facto law s, 
despite its non-punitive, regulatory intent and effect. The Second Circuit also erroneously 
concluded that Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act deprives registrants of due process 
rights, even though it neither falsely stigmatizes them nor terminates any tangible interest as 
defined by this Court. In light of the strong public policies favoring these statutes as tools tor 
promoting public safety. Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to RLV LRSL the Judgments ot 
the Ninth and Second Circuits.
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